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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Court’s practice of unofficially applying precedent, contrary
to actual statutory authority, negatively impacts the Court’s authority. Specifically, the absence of
an official doctrine of stare decisis diminishes the Court’s ethos and the rhetorical clout imputed
to the Court’s decisions. 28 Part I discusses the Court’s character in providing states with a con-
sistent, statutorily authorized rhetoric to refer to in their compromissory interactions, the Court’s
acknowledgment of the written rules, and its subsequent use of precedent. Part I also examines the
past under-utilization of the ICJ to settle treaty disputes, and the recent increasing trend in states’
reliance on the ICJ as the potential interpreter of treaties. Part II analyzes the ICJ’s statutory au-
thority, and their interpretations and practices regarding that authority. Part III argues that without
binding the Court statutorily the effect of precedent on later decisions of the ICJ undermines the
rhetoric of the Court, thereby undermining the ethos, or authoritativeness, of the Court to decide
conflicts between disputing states. Part III also argues that if the authoritativeness of the Court’s
rhetoric is questionable, the increased reliance on the ICJ as the adjudicator of potential treaty dis-
putes could be reversed, causing a return to under-utilization of the Court. Part III further argues
that in order to prevent a return to under-utilization of the Court, the written statute that defines the
Court should reflect the Court’s practices. This Comment concludes that binding the Court to its
past decisions by amending the ICJ statute would increase the ICJ’s rhetorical ethos, thus adding
more precedential weight to the Court’s decisions and authoritative use of its service.
COMMENT
THE ETHOS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE STATUTORY
AUTHORITY ATTRIBUTED TO ITS
RHETORIC: A METADISCOURSE
H. Ven Clemons*
The law is not a universal, timeless set of rules that arises by
necessity but is created, defined, and maintained by the dis-
course in which it is situated.1
INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice' ("ICJ" or the "Court")
decides legal disputes submitted by states, and gives advisory
opinions to certain international organs and agencies.3 The es-
tablishment of the ICJ was a continuation4 of the idea that pa-
cific procedures for dispute settlement could be a substitute for
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University.
1. FREDERIC GALE, POLITICAL LiTERAc.: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF JUSTICE 129 (1994).
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 7. Article 7 of the U.N. Charter establishes the International
Court ofJustice ("ICJ" or the "Court") as a principal organ of the United Nations. See
id. (establishing ICJ as separate and independent organ of United Nations). The Stat-
ute of the Court forms an integral part of the Charter drawn up at the United Nations
Conference on International Organization in 1945 in San Francisco. See SIAaTnM
ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 23 (1989) [hereinafter
WORU COURT] (discussing formation and purpose of ICJ). The drafters of the Statute
used as a basis of their design the revised Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice ("PCIJ") of 1929. Id. at 25.
3. See I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1994) (defining role of ICJ as
decision maker in disputes between states).
4. See e.g., ANTONIO DEBusTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 2-6 (Elizabeth Read trans.,
1925) (giving examples of various civilizations throughout history that relied on neutral
system of dispute resolution). In the Roman empire, non-Roman citizens went to a
special court which utilized a universal law instead of Roman law. See id. at 2 (present-
ing Roman solution to inter-citizen dispute resolution). Immediately after the fall of
the Roman empire, Christian states would turn to the Popes to settle their disputes. See
id. at 3 (discussing Papal solution to inter-state dispute resolution). The international
authority of the Papacy was powerful enough to have rulers like Charles V submitted to
it for dispute resolution. See id. at 4-5 (discussing types of rulers who willingly submitted
to neutral inter-state dispute resolution). Today, American and European Republics
seek international arbitration to settle their conflicts. See id. at 5-6 (suggesting that
pattern of dispute resolution continues in same pacific resolution of disputes).
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war.5 Where prescribed, contracting parties regard judicial dis-
cernment as the most effective means of settling disputes that
diplomacy has failed to resolve.6
International adjudication contributes to the shaping and
maintenance of the infrastructure of the world community.
7
Commentators note that the most effective and accepted rulings
of the ICJ are those that are prospective and general about the
maintenance of world order.8 A court's rhetoric9 is concerned
with persuading states to abide by its decisions.1" The perceived
effort by the ICJ to consider the interests of states has persuaded
5. See JOHN KING GAMBLE, JR. & DANA FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE 1 (1976) (discussing role of ICJ as alternative to war). The United Nations estab-
lished the ICJ to decide disputes that governments set in motion as an exercise of the
responsibilities states entrusted to them. See also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 82
(examining authority given to governments to bring cases to ICJ).
6. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 9 (suggesting thatjudicial resolution steps in
where diplomatic talks have failed to resolve issues between states).
7. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 6-7 (stating that international adjudication
helps sustain world order).
8. See GALE, supra note 1 (presenting rhetoric ofjurisprudence as explanation of
rules of interpretation for purpose of making Court'sjurisprudence predictable). Aqui-
nas addresses the need for law in the following way:
Law, properly speaking, regards first and chiefly an ordering to the common
good. Now to order anything to the common good belongs either to the
whole people or to someone who is viceregent of the whole people. And
therefore, the making of law belongs either to the whole people or to a public
personage who has care of the whole people ....
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALTrrY, AND POLITICS 15 (edited, with introduction
by RichardJ. Regan, S.J. and William P. Baumgarth 1988). "[W]ell-drawn laws should
themselves define all the points they possibly can." ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 6 (W. Rhys
Roberts trans., 1963).
9. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 5-8. Rhetoric is the study of persuasive discourse
employed by a speaker to convey an idea to an audience. Id. (discussing and defining
concept of rhetoric). Aristotle defines rhetoric as "that branch of discourse which con-
cerns persuasion." Id. at 5. The word rhetor is Greek and means "speaker in the assem-
bly," and referred to the practice of oratory, or formal public speaking. Id. at 38. Fo-
rensic or judicial rhetoric is the discourse of a court, which speaks to the justice or
injustice of a past action. Id. Rhetoricians explain the three elements to the rhetorical
speech as the ethos, which is reflective of the authority of the speaker; the logos, which
illustrates the rationale of the speaker's discourse; and the pathos, which is the
speaker's appeal to the perspective of the audience. See id. Aristotle identified these as
the three means of persuasion: the appeal to the reason, which is logos; the appeal to
emotion, which is pathos; and the appeal of the speaker's character, which is ethos. Id.
at 75.
10. See GALE, supra note 1, at 8 (referring to legal interpretation as rhetoric of
courts); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 75 (referring to forensic rhetoric as dis-
course of court).
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states to accept the ICJ's decisions readily." These states feel
that their interests lie in the maintenance of the established or-
der and in the consistency. of interpretation of their common
law.12 The ethos of the ICJ is dependant upon the authority at-
tributed to its rhetoric by statute.13
Historically, states used the ICJ sparingly to settle their dis-
putes. 14 Key sovereign states were hesitant to grant authority to
the ICJ to settle disputes with lesser developed states.' 5 These
states felt obligated to bind themselves in compromissory agree-
ments only with other states they felt were their equals in stat-
ure.
16
During the post-World War II period 7 world trade grew tre-
mendously.' 8 Progressive developing countries' 9 with high
11. See GALE, supra note 1, at 24 (viewing rhetoric as persuasive interpretive dis-
course, reminiscent of Aristotle); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 75 (referring to
forensic rhetoric as reflective of court's ethos).
12. See e.g., Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18)
(demonstrating use of consistent interpretation by the Court). See also ARISTOTLE, supra
note 8, at 38 (suggesting that congruous legal interpretations lead to consistent under-
standings of law, which induces predictable behavior by citizens, thereby producing
societal order).
13. See GAMBLE & FISCHER, supra note 5, at 1-2 (establishing the statutorily author-
ized role of the court). See also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 82 (emphasizing impor-
tance of authority given by statute to ICJ).
14. See GAMBLE AND FISCHER, supra note 5, at 4-5 (discussing past inactivity of ICJ);
see also THOMAS FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 9 (1986) (stating that ICJ was basi-
cally idle for two decades).
15. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 27-31 (examining hesitation of independent na-
tions to submit to someone else's authority).
16. See id. (suggesting that nations only felt obligated to submit to neutral jurisdic-
tion when their adversary is viewed as economic equal).
17. See Gottfried Haberler, Overview, in TRADE STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, 49-51
(1972) (defining post-World War II period as beginning in 1945 and continuing until
roughly 1975).
18. See Haberler, supra note 17, at 49-51 (analyzing growth of world trade as it has
expanded to include many new developing countries in trade with each other and with
developed countries).
19. See W.W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWrH: A NON-COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO 7-9 (1960) (defining developing countries by economic measures). Devel-
oping countries are those states in which economic progress expands and begins to
dominate society. See id. (describing economic effect on society in developing coun-
tries). In developing countries, "growth becomes (a] normal condition." Id. Status as
a developing state originates from gaining independence from the colonization and
suppression of capitalization. See Andre Gunder Frank, Essays on the Development of Un-
derdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy, in LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR
REVOLUTION 21-23 (1966) (explaining how colonization and suppression of capitalistic
growth by developed countries affects economic health of developing countries).
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growth rates in their Gross Domestic Product and volume trade
are new participants in the world community,20 with new voices
about international laws and practices. 21 No longer are the pre-
World War II, industrialized Western countries22 the only treaty-
makers and potential parties in contiguous cases brought before
the ICJ. 2 ' Developing countries are trading and contracting with
each other and with the developed countries of the world com-
munity.
24
Due to the growing diversity of cultures comprising the
world community, it is often difficult to decide which or whose
cultural norm should prevail in international disputes.25  The
ICJ often decides whether a particular norm is becoming more
important, or is losing authority.26 The effectiveness of the
Court's judicial rhetoric as precedent functions to provide and
protect the infrastructure of the world community. 27
This Comment argues that the Court's practice of unoffi-
cially applying precedent, contrary to actual statutory authority,
negatively impacts the Court's authority. Specifically, the ab-
sence of an official doctrine of stare decisis diminishes the Court's
ethos and the rhetorical clout imputed to the Court's deci-
sions.28 Part I discusses the Court's character in providing states
20. See ROSTOW, supra note 19, at 10 (recognizing body of independent nations
that participate in international activities); see also Haberler, supra note 17, at 50-51
(describing international body created of individual countries that interact with each
other).
21. See Haberler, supra note 17, at 50-52 (implying that new developing countries
bring new types of concerns and outlooks than developed countries which were mostly
similar in culture and interests).
22. See RosTow, supra note 19, at 10 (defining developed countries in context to
developing countries). Industrialized Western states, or developed countries, have
reached a status of maturity when society, through the political process, has "chosen to
allocate increased resources to social welfare and security." Id. The extension of tech-
nology and industrial advances are no longer a necessary preoccupation of society. Id.
23. See id. (suggesting that prior to developing countries beginning to bring cases
to ICJ, most cases were brought by similar nations with similar concerns).
24. See id. (describing present day economic situation and need for resolution of
disputes coming from various perspectives and concerns).
25. See id. (discussing various social norms that appear before ICJ).
26. See id. (analyzing how ICJ weighs various social norms).
27. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 6-7 (describing stabilizing effect ofjudicial
dispute resolution between states).
28. See MORRIS L. COHEN & ROBERT C. BERRING, FINDING THE LAw 4-7 (1984) (de-
fining stare decisis as naturally occurring). Stare decisis is the binding nature of prece-
dents. Id. The doctrine of stare decisis purports the idea that people in similar situa-
tions are treated in a similar manner and judgements on their behalf be consistent,
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with a consistent, statutorily authorized rhetoric to refer to in
their compromissory interactions, the Court's acknowledgment
of the written rules, and its subsequent use of precedent. Part I
also examines the past under-utilization of the ICJ to settle treaty
disputes, and the recent increasing trend in states' reliance on
the ICJ as the potential interpreter of treaties. Part II analyzes
the ICJ's statutory authority, and their interpretations and prac-
tices regarding that authority. Part III argues that without bind-
ing the Court statutorily the effect of precedent on later deci-
sions of the ICJ undermines the rhetoric of the Court, thereby
undermining the ethos, or authoritativeness, of the Court to de-
cide conflicts between disputing states. Part III also argues that
if the authoritativeness of the Court's rhetoric is questionable,
the increased reliance on the ICJ as the adjudicator of potential
treaty disputes could be reversed, causing a return to under-utili-
zation of the Court. Part III further argues that in order to pre-
vent a return to under-utilization of the Court, the written stat-
ute that defines the Court should reflect the Court's practices.
This Comment concludes that binding the Court to its past deci-
sions by amending the ICJ statute would increase the ICJ's rhe-
torical ethos, thus adding more precedential weight to the
Court's decisions and authoritative use of its service.
I. THE CONCEPT OF RHETORIC AND THE COMPOSITION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Rhetorical discourse is an attempt to persuade, which exam-
ines the speaker, the message, and the audience, in order to un-
derstand the effect the speaker's rhetoric has achieved.2 9 The
rather than arbitrary. Id. at 4. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the parties to treaties
may "predict the consequences of contemplated conduct by reference to the treatment
afforded similar conduct in the past." Id. When a judicial decision settles a point of
law, future disputants should adhere to that decision unless the Court deems departure
from the decision necessary to vindicate principles of law or to remedy injustice. Id. at
6-7.
29. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 16 (defining rhetorical discourse as process of
weighing speaker's credibility with specific audience under unique circumstances).
The precedent provides future guidance and the opinion passes judgment on the past.
See id. at 17 (suggesting that while opinions deal with rationalizing case at hand, prece-
dent is applied to future cases as predictable measure of how ICJ would resolve similar
disputes in future). The precedent is about things to be done hereafter that the Court
advises, for or against. See also id. (discussing rhetorical direction of thought and usage
of rhetorical message presented by speaker and illustrating effect ofjudicial opinions
after immediacy of present case). Interpretive discourse is not a neutral vehicle to com-
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principle task of the ICJ is to ensure respect for international
law.3" As developing countries entered the international com-
munity, developing countries' concerns gained equal weight in
the eyes of other states and the ICJ. 1
A. Rhetoric: Discourse and Its Relevance to the Courts
The three rhetorical categories of oratory are political, judi-
cial, and ceremonial.32 Rhetoric's first use was in the legal fo-
rum as judicial rhetoric.3 3 Modern judicial rhetoric has main-
tained its original function, using the Court's past decisions as
part of the persuasive rationale for present cases.34
1. The Concept of Rhetoric
Aristotle described rhetoric as an attempt to persuade the
listener through knowledge of the speaker's ethos, the logos of
the speaker's message, and the pathos of the audience to which
the speaker directed the message. 5 The court's ethos may be
most demonstrative of this rhetorical persuasion. 36 Aristotle
thought that the function of rhetoric was to answer questions of
municate the law, but rather a powerful influence on its audiences' beliefs. See MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (Alan Sheridan-Smith trans., 1970) (emphasizing
persuasive impact of rhetorical discourse and suggesting that it is not just style and
delivery that influence, but rather substance as decided by words chosen and choice of
speaker).
30. See SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE ICJ 74 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter LAw & PRACTICE OF THE IGJ] (discussing the role of the ICJ).
31. See Keith Highet, Recent Developments in the International Court of Justice, in TRI-
LATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: RELEVANCE OF DOMESTIC LAW
AND POLICY 340 (Michael Young & Yuji Iwasawa eds., 1996) (discussing how developing
countries are more likely than developed countries to include compromissory clauses,
or mutual stipulations to refer disputes to arbitration, in their treaties and conventions
because of ICJ's perceived continuity).
32. See id. (categorizing rhetorical types into forensic, ceremonial, and political
rhetoric).
33. See GALE, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing original uses of rhetorical discourse
and how to sustain those uses in modem judicial rhetoric).
34. See id. at 24 (describing how original use of rhetoric continues).
35. See AiusTroTi E, supra note 8, at 5-7 (analyzing effects of rhetoric by examining
speaker, message, and audience).
36. See GALE, supra note 1, at 24 (describing how ethos directly attributes to au-
thority imputed to jurisprudence). The court's character may be considered an effec-
tive means of persuasion. See id. (suggesting that ethos has direct influence on how
judgements are viewed and accepted).
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harm. 7 The first question dealt with whether something hap-
pened."' If so, the second question concerned whether harm
existed. 9 If so, the third question addressed the greatness of the
harm.4' Finally, if great harm is present, then the fourth ques-
tion asked whether that great harm is justified.41 Cicero, a great
lawyer and rhetor, who used rhetoric and logic conjointly, incor-
porated this approach into his work.42 Renaissance humanists
followed Cicero's lead by attempting to join wisdom with rheto-
ric. 43 Eighteenth century rhetoricians suggested that an under-
standing of rhetoric reveals rhetoric's influence on man's beliefs
and, from these beliefs, rhetoric's influence on the cultivation of
knowledge.' Some modern rhetoricians suggest that judicial
opinions are in fact interpretive discourses of the Aristotelian
type, persuasive discourse. 45 This interpretive discourse is not a
neutral vehicle to communicate the law, but rather a powerful
influence on its audience's beliefs and from this it acquires its
knowledge.46
2. Judicial Rhetoric
Judicial rhetoric can refer to two different time periods.47
37. See ARiSTOTLE, supra note 8, at 20 (stating that Aristotle developed theory of
Stasis, describing type of questions that trier of fact must ask to determine facts of case).
38. See GALE, supra note 1, at 20-22 (stating which questions dealing with harm are
asked); see also AgisTOTLE, supra note 8, at 48 (discussing stasis theory which imputes to
forensic speakers concern with wrong-doing, its motives, its perpetrators, and its vic-
tims).
39. See GALE, supra note 1, at 20 (listing questions of harm).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 20-22 (discussing effect of stasis theory on Cicero's writings).
43. See id. at 23 (discussing stasis theory effect on renaissance humanists, such as
Machiavelli and Thomas More). Machiavelli writes of real virtue as the true equivalent
of power in Discourses. ANTHONY KENNY ET AL, THE OxFoRD HISroRy OF WFSTERN PHI.
LOSOPHY 307-8 (Anthony Kenny ed. 1994). More's Utopia also attempts to join wisdom
with rhetoric through his stature in socio-religious society and his subtle critique of
Plato's Republic. Id.
44. See id. (stating "an analysis of rhetoric could reveal the ways in which belief is
influenced and from belief Knowledge is created").
45. See id. at 24 (suggesting that judicial opinions are vehicles used by judges to
interpret law and persuade their audience, parties to each case).
46. See FOUCAULT, supra note 29 (emphasizing persuasive impact of rhetorical dis-
course and suggesting that it is not just style and delivery that influence audiences, but
rather substance, as decided by words chosen and choice of speaker).
47. See ARiSTOTLE, supra note 8, at 17 (discussing rhetorical direction of thought
and usage of rhetorical message presented by speaker).
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The precedent is concerned with the future and the opinion is
concerned with the past.4 8 The precedent is about things to be
done hereafter that the court advises, for or against.49 The pre-
cedent aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of
a proposed course of action.5 ° If the court urges the acceptance
of the action, the court does so on the ground that the action
will do good.51 If the court urges rejection of the action, the
court does so on the ground that the action will do harm. The
opinion refers to things already done. 5 The opinion aims at es-
tablishing the justice or injustice of some action.54
B. The International Court ofJustice
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter created the ICJ.15 The IGJ is
the only permanent judicial organ of the United Nations and its
principal task is to ensure respect for international law.56 The
ICJ has litigious and advisory jurisdiction,57 and applies the
48. See id. at 17 (emphasizing difference in usefulness of judicial opinion from
their immediate use to their later application). Aristotle believed that:
[t] he [speaker] aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a
proposed course of action; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground
that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it
will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or
unjust, honorable or dishonorable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to
this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or
injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary
and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him
worthy of honor or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with
reference to this one.
Id.
49. See id. (illustrating effect ofjudicial opinions after immediacy of present case).
50. See ARIsTOTLE, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing long range effects of precedent).
51. See id. (stating a judge's belief in its own good faith efforts).
52. See id. (describing role ofjudge's discourse).
53. See id. (describing role of opinion).
54. See id. (illustrating immediacy of effect of opinions).
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 33 (directing members of U.N. to seek peaceful resolution).
Judicial settlement is peaceful as laid out in Article 33 of the Charter. See SA WILLIAMS
& A.L.C. DE MEsrAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 1, 56 (1979) (describ-
ing U.N. directive forming ICJ and defining international law as system of law contain-
ing principles, customs, standards, and rules to govern relations among states and other
international persons).
56. See LAw AND PRACrICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 74-75 (discussing role of
ICJ); see also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 23-24 (examining purpose of ICJ).
57. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 81 (defining jurisdiction as power or au-
thority of Court to issue decisions based on substance or merits of cases placed before
it); see also id. at 81-88 (describing categories ofjurisdiction of ICJ).
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sources of law enumerated in ICJ Statute Art. 38.58
1. Establishment of the ICJ
In the 19th century, a peace movement sought the creation
of a permanent international court as a way of resolving disputes
between states and preventing those disputes from escalating
into war.59 At a conference at the Hague in 1899, the partici-
pants formed the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA")."6
Under the covenant of the League of Nations, 1 in 1921 the
framers established a Permanent Court of International Justice
("PCIJ"), replacing the PCA.6 2 The PCIJ existed, along with the
League of Nations, until 1945.63
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter proposes the settlement of in-
ternational disputes in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law.' The U.N. Charter created the ICJ as a
replacement for the PCIJ. 65 The PCIJ dissolved along with the
League of Nations that created it.66 The U.N. Charter annexed,
58. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE 79 (Shabtai Rosenne, ed. 1991) [here-
inafter ICJ STATUTE]. The ICJ was created to decide disputes in accordance with inter-
national law as enumerated below:
a. international conventions and treaties, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
Id.
59. See DEBuSTAMANrE, supra note 4, at 41-43 (discussing role of peace move-
ment); see also WORIu COURT, supra note 2, at 11-18 (describing inception of perma-
nent international court).
60. See DEBuSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 41-44 (describing origination of PCA).
61. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 11-13 (discussing formation of League of
Nations).
62. See id. at 41-45 (describing origination of PCIJ).
63. See id. (describing termination of PCIJ).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 33 (directing members of U.N. to seek peaceful resolution).
Judicial settlement is pacific settlement as laid out in Article 33 of the Charter. See
WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 56 (describing U.N. directive forming ICJ).
65. See WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 56 (describing origination of
PCIJ); see also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 23 (describing origination of PCIJ).
66. See WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 57 (discussing dissolving of
League of Nations and PCIJ); see also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing
dissolution of League of Nations and PCIJ).
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but did not incorporate, the Statute controlling the ICJ.6 7 The
U.N. Charter designates the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of
the U.N. body.68 The ICJ Statute and the ICJ Rules govern the
proceedings before the Court.69
A majority of the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly elect fifteen judges to the ICJ. 7° Each judge serves a nine
year term. 71 The Statute of the Court does not require a judge
from a state that is party to a case before the Court to recuse
himself or herself.72 Instead, the other party may add a judge of
their choice to the bench.73
2. Function of the ICJ
The Court is the only permanent judicial organ for the
world community, and its principal task is to ensure respect for
international law.74 The Court is neither a constitutional 75 nor a
supreme court.76 The mandatory language of the ICJ Statute
confers upon the ICJ a duty to acknowledge and apply interna-
tional law and thereby settle disputes among nations.77 The
67. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 1, at 61 (annexing the ICJ to U.N. Charter); see
also WILLIAMS & DE MEsTRAL, supra note 55, at 57 (referencing ICJ Statute and inception
based on U.N. Charter).
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (designating ICJ as principal organ of United Nations);
see WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55 (describing ICJ as principal organ of U.N.
body).
69. ICJ STATUTE; Rules of the International Court of Justice, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Shabtai Rosenne ed., (rev. Apr. 14,
1978)) [hereinafter ICJ RULES].
70. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, arts. 3-4, at 61 (describing number and selection of
judges of ICJ).
71. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 13, at 67; see also FRANCK, supra note 14, at 7
(discussing nine year election term for ICJ judges).
72. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 31, at 73, 75 (allowing judges to serve in cases
involving their home state).
73. Id.
74. See LAw AND PRACTICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 74-75 (establishing goal of
ICJ); see also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 23-24 (examining purpose of ICJ).
75. WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 35. A constitutional court has the judicial au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of the actions of other organs or branches of a
constitutionally bases organization or government. Id. The ICJ does not have the
power of judicial review to determine the constitutionality of the actions of other or-
gans of the United Nations. Id.
76. Id. A supreme court has authoritative influence over lower courts in its judicial
structure. Id. The ICJ does not exercise superior jurisdiction over other international
tribunals or courts. Id.
77. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, arts. 34-38, at 75, 77, 79; see WORLD COURT, supra
note 2, at 35 (defining duties of ICJ). See also LAw & PRACTICE OF THE ICJ, supra note
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Court provides judicial guidance and support: for the work of
other U.N. organs 8.7  The authoritative character of the Court,
as defined within its Statute, directly empowers the Court's rhet-
oric to settle disputes. 9
Cases may commence either by notification to the Court of
a special agreement between the states, or by both states filing
an application to the Court. ° The choice is a matter for the
states concerned, because the Statute does not state when one
method or the other should be employed.8 t The Court requires
two distinct phases for presenting each case.82 These phases are
written pleadings, 3 prepared in either English or French, and
publicly 4 held oral pleadings, in either language. 5 The ICJ
conducts internal deliberations in complete secrecy.86 The judg-
ment rendered must specifically mention the rationale of the
opinion, including the legal reasons for the decision. 8
3. Jurisdiction
The ICJ has litigious and advisory jurisdiction.89 There are
30, at 49 (stating Court's duty is owed both to parties in dispute and to international
community at large and suggesting ICJ had no discretionary power to disregard terms
of ICJ Statute); see WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 1 (confining role of ICJ to
stipulations of its statute).
78. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 35 (discussing auxiliary functions per-
formed by ICJ).
79. See id. (defining goal of ICJ's discourse).
80. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 40(1), at 79 (stating how cases are brought
before ICJ); see WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 115.
81. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 40, at 79; see WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at
115 (reiterating that states decide which issues are brought before Court).
82. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 43(1), at 81 (stipulating written and oral proce-
dures of ICJ); see WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 113 (discussing requirements of ICJ
procedures).
83. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 43(2),(3), at 81 (stating requirements of writ-
ten proceedings and communications of ICJ).
84. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 46, at 81. The ICJ hearing is public, unless
decided otherwise. Id.
85. Id. art. 43(5) (stating requirements of oral proceedings of ICJ).
86. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 54(3), at 83. The ICJ deliberates in private and
their deliberations remain secret. Id.
87. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 56, at 85. The judgement states the rationale
of the decision and the judges who participated. Id.
88. ICJ RULES arts. 94-95 supra note 69, at 267 (outlining requirements of ICJ
judgements).
89. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 81-88 (defining jurisdiction as power or
authority of Court to issue decisions based on substance or merits of cases placed before
it and describing categories of jurisdiction of ICJ).
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two primary ways to bestow jurisdiction in cases. 90 The first type
is consent by bilateral or multilateral agreement, by way of a spe-
cific agreement between states to submit their treaty specific
conflicts to the Court.9" The second type is a state's unilateral
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for specific
types of disputes.92
a. Types of Jurisdiction
The ICJ can exercise two types of jurisdiction, litigious and
advisory.93 Litigious jurisdiction is available to states for their
disputes.94 This type of decision is binding on the parties to the
dispute and enforceable, when necessary, through the U.N. Se-
curity Council.95 Advisory jurisdiction is available for interna-
tional organizations and yields an unenforceable advisory opin-
ion prior to litigation."
b. Consent to Article 36(1)
The Court's jurisdiction extends to all cases that the states
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the U.N. Char-
ter.9 7 Once a state grants the ICJ jurisdictional power over spe-
cific matters, that state is bound to comply with the decision of
90. See id. (discussing ways to acquire jurisdiction of ICJ); see also id. at 84 (stating
primary avenues to ICJ adjudication).
91. See id. at 84 (describing way states gain ICJ jurisdiction by consent via ICJ Stat-
ute art. 36(1)).
92. See id. (describing way to acquire ICJ jurisdiction by declaring submission to
ICJ Statute art. 36 (2)). Although unilateral declaration is sometimes called compul-
sory jurisdiction, this reference is misleading because the act of consent to the Court's
jurisdiction is still voluntary in nature. Id. Compulsoryjurisdiction exists when a treaty,
either multilateral or bilateral, pertaining to a specific topic or activity, contains a com-
promissory clause referring disputes of that treaty to the Court unilaterally. Id.
93. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 81-88 (defining jurisdiction as power or
authority of Court to issue decisions based on substance or merits of cases placed before
it and describing categories ofjurisdiction of ICJ).
94. See id. (stating that states may bring litigation before ICJ).
95. See id. (stating conditions of bringing litigious cases before ICJ).
96. See id. (discussing ICJjurisdiction to give advisory opinions prior to litigation).
97. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 36(1), at 77 (stating conditions under which
jurisdiction of ICJ may take place); see also WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 81 (defining
jurisdiction under ICJ Statute art. 36(1)). The type of matters specially provided for in
the U.N. Charter are advisory opinions for the Security Council, the General Assembly
of the United Nations, and specialized Agencies of the United Nations. U.N.. CHARTER
art. 96 (authorizing ICJ to give advisory opinions).
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the Court on that matter.9" Jurisdiction becomes compulsory
when a provision of a bilateral or multilateral treaty stipulates
that the ICJ will resolve disputes.99 The availability of the ICJ to a
state, via U.N. membership, does not necessarily oblige that state
to have the ICJ decide its disputes with other states 10° If a dis-
pute arises as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the ICJ will
.setde the matter. 101
c. Unilateral Declarations Under Article 36(2)
Art. 36(2)102 is only one of the ways to generate compulsory
jurisdiction. 11 3 Some states simply refused to bind themselves to
the ICJ through Article 36(2).104 These states would, however,
sometimes create provisions in their treaties that technically cre-
ated an equally compulsory jurisdiction." 5
4. Sources of Law
The Court applies the rules of law as enumerated in ICJ
98. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 36(1), at 77 (discussing jurisdiction of ICJ via
bilateral or multilateral treaty).
99. Id. (stating that jurisdiction of ICJ comprises all cases which parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in U.N. Charter, in treaties, or in conventions in
force).
100. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 36, at 77 (stating ways states choose to submit
to jurisdiction of ICJ); see also DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OFJUSTICE 7 (1983) [hereinafter PUBLIC] (explaining that once states submit to
jurisdiction, it no longer can withdraw for lack of agreement with ICJ decisions).
101. See PUBLIC, supra note 100, at 6 (noting that ICJ will decide disputes over its
jurisdiction).
102. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 36(2), at 77. Art. 36(2) states that:
The parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recog-
nize as compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement, in relation to any
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction or the Court in all
legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Id.
103. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 36, at 77 (discussing compulsory jurisdiction).
104. Id. (declaring unilateral submission to jurisdiction of ICJ).
105. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 48-50 (analyzing how states can create compul-
sory jurisdiction under ICJ Statute art. 36(1), through irrevocable treaties, that is just as
binding as ICJ Statute art. 36(2)).
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Statute Art. 38.106 Treaties10 7 are a deliberate method that con-
tracting state parties employ to bind themselves in international
agreements, 10 8 and as such, treaties serve as one of the enumer-
ated sources of international law stipulated in Art. 38.109 Cus-
tomary international law carries evidence of general practices
that have become recognized as law and enumerated as a source
of international law recognized by the ICJ.110 The ICJ utilizes
judicial decisions, which are enumerated as only subsidiary
sources, as material sources of international law.111
The international conventions,11 2 or treaties, referred to in
Art. 38(1) (a) of the ICJ Statute lead to the formation of interna-
tional law.11 Law-making treaties have the general effect of
guiding states in their future international conduct.114 The ICJ
uses Art. 38(1) (a) as a guiding source of interpretive law when
the parties in dispute have a written agreement outlining the
106. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 38, at 79. See also, supra note 58. (describing
that ICJ was created to decide disputes in accordance with international law). In the
alternative, the ICJ may decide a case ex aequo et bono, if both parties agree to this ap-
proach. See WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 145 (defining ex aequo et bono as means ICJ
may use to decide case based on what is just and good, and not be required to base its
decision on established law and stating ex aequo et bono has not been utilized).
107. See WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 14 (differentiating between trea-
ties as either law-making treaties or as treaty contracts). Law-making treaties lay down
general rules that are binding on a majority of states and are a direct source of law. Id.
Treaty contracts are made between two or more states, and address matters that are of
specific concern to the parties involved. Id. Synonyms for treaty include: conventions,
protocol, agreement, arrangements, statutes and declarations. Id.
108. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 77-78 (1986) (defining treaties as
written agreement outlining series of conditions and arrangements agreed upon by par-
ties to contract and serving as binding upon parties to agreement).
109. See id. at 79 (discussing ways treaties may contribute to wealth of international
law sources).
110. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 31-32 (defining customary international law as
utilized by ICJ as source of law, i.e. regional trade practices that are recognized as tradi-
tional and multicultural).
111. See SHAW, supra note 108, at 86 (stating "[a] Ithough these are, in the words of
article 38, to be utili[s]ed as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law
rather than as an actual source of law, judicial decisions can be of immense impor-
tance").
112. See WILLIAMS & DE MESTRAL, supra note 55, at 14 (defining international con-
ventions as treaties).
113. See id. (discussing types of treaties and distinguishing between law-making
and contract treaties); see also SHEARER, supra note 3, at 37 (stating "[t]he effect of any
treaty in leading to the formation of rules of international law depends on the nature of
the treaty concerned").
114, See SHAW, supra note 108, at 79 (discussing effect treaties can have on develop-
ing international law).
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conditions and arrangements they agree to uphold.11 5 More
states are including conditions and arrangements in their trea-
ties than in past use,' 1 6 and, therefore, the use of treaty law as a
source for international legal dispute resolution is increasing.1 7
Art. 38(1) (b) lists customary international law as a material
source to be utilized in deliberations by the ICJ when evaluating
whether a general practice of the states in dispute is in fact ac-
cepted law." 8 Customary international law has evolved generally
through recognition by the international community of the prac-
tices of several of its states as the law." 9 Multilateral treaties may
also serve as a source of customary international practice which,
after time and volume, may evolve into customary international
law. 1 20
Art. 38(1) (d), along with Art. 59, of the ICJ Statute
designates the past decisions of the ICJ as subsidiary sources for
determining the rule of law the Court should apply.1 2 ' The ICJ,
in an attempt to provide consistency in the body of international
law, examines previous decisions and references them as guide-
lines toward choosing the applicable law in similar circum-
stances. 12 2 While the Court will review its previous decisions, 123
it meticulously distinguishes cases that it feels are non-applicable
to a present case.'2 4 The Court also examines whether or not
the legal position of a past case is relevant to the circumstances
115. See id. at 77-78 (defining treaties as written agreement outlining series of con-
ditions and arrangements agreed upon by parties to contract and serving as binding
upon parties to agreement).
116. See Highet, supra note 31, at 339-40 (describing and analyzing current increas-
ing trend in ICJ activity).
117. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 37 (examining increase in ICJ activity).
118. See SHAw, supra note 108, at 61 (describing essence of customary international
law as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
119. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 31 (defining customary international law and
discussing it as source of international law); see also SAw, supra note 108, at 61 (stating
"customary law is founded upon the performance of state activities and the conver-
gence of practices" and that there exists subjective belief that this behavior is law).
120. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 36 (explaining how multi-lateral treaties can also
lead to established rules of customary international law).
121. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, arts. 38, 59, at 79, 85.
122. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 41 (examining ICJ's use of its own prior deci-
sions as source of law). See also SHAw, supra note 108, at 86 (discussing Court's use of its
own past decisions as material source of international law).
123. See supra note 108, at 86 (describing practice of ICJ in presenting rationale of
Court).
124. See id. (examining ability of ICJ to differentiate between cases that are applica-
ble and non-applicable to present case).
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of its present case. 12 5
C. States' Uses of the ICJ
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, states submitted to
the jurisdiction of the ICJ irregularly. 126 During the late 1980s,
states began to bring more cases before the ICJ.127 As develop-
ing countries became equal members of the international com-
munity, developed countries and the ICJ began to give equal
weight to developing countries' concerns and customs.1 2 8
1. Pre-1975 Use of the ICJ
Until the 1980s, developed countries were generally unwill-
ing to take matters of international importance to the ICJ. 129
Even among the states that had initially recognized the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the ICJ, there was a tendency to refuse to
appear before the Court or to adhere to the Court's decisions. 130
Most states did not accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
under Article 36(2).111 Of the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council, only the United States132 and the United
Kingdom submitted to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
under Article 36(2).1 3
Many states did not take compulsory jurisdiction seri-
125. See LAw AND PAcrICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 620-21 (applying discre-
tion of ICJ to each particular case).
126. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing Franck's perception of under-utili-
zation of ICJ).
127. See id. (discussing level of activity of ICJ).
128. See Highet, supra note 31, at 340 (discussing how developing countries are
more likely than developed countries to include compromissory clauses or mutual stip-
ulations in their treaties and conventions to refer disputes to arbitration, because of
ICJ's perceived continuity).
129. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 47 (commenting on developed countries unwill-
ingness to submit to ICJ jurisdiction).
130. See id. at 47-48 (illustrating lack of respect for ICJ by developed countries).
131. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 48 (describing lack of submission of cases to ICJ
jurisdiction from the 1950s to the 1970s).
132. See id. The U.S. terminated this compulsory jurisdiction October 7, 1985. See
id. at 85 n.39 (announcing the termination of U.S. acknowledgment of compulsory
jurisdiction).
133. See id. at 48 (discussing process of submitting dispute to ICJ jurisdiction).
The United States has since withdrawn its submission to Article 36(2). Id. The United
States announced its decision to terminate compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under
Art. 36(2). Id. When President Truman accepted the ICJ's optional compulsory juris-
diction in 1946, the United States expected other states to act similarly. Id.- Few other
states followed the United States' example. Id. Less than one-third of the developed
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ously.1t 4 Although the Court has not been able to secure accept-
ance by most developed countries for its compulsory jurisdic-
tion, quite a few developing countries have embraced both Arti-
cle 36(1) and 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction.13 These
developing countries are beginning to participate in shaping the
institutions and norms of the international legal system.1 36
2. Post-1975 Use of the ICJ
From its inception until 1975, the ICJ handed down forty
judgements and advisory opinions. 137 Since 1975, the ICJ has
addressed, or is currently addressing, eighty-eight cases, which is
more than twice as many cases than in the previous era.138 Eight-
een of these cases have come up within the past decade.139
and developing states have accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, and the former
Soviet Union and its allies were never among them. Id.
134. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov.
26) (illustrating how United States did not take its compulsoryjurisdiction seriously in
Nicaragua's claim against it and thereby failed to protect itself); see SHAW, supra note
108, at 527, 529 (examining value ofjudicial clout where states refuse to abide by it); see
also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24) (discribing Iran's refusal to obey ICJ); WoRLD COURT, supra note 2, at 206;
Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (Mar. 25) (illustrating Alba-
nia's disregard for ICJ and refusal to appear as respondent in early stages of case);
Monetary Gold (Italy v. Fr., Gr. Brit., N. Ir., and U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15) (demon-
strating Albania's refusal to appear before ICJ at any time during case); see also FRANCK,
supra note 14, at 50 (demonstrating how states responded to jurisdiction by ICJ).
135. See FANcK, supra note 14, at 50-51 (noting that by 1984, developing states
submitting to Art. 36jurisdiction included Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Togo,' Uganda, and Uruguay). Some states submitted to Art. 36 with similar stipulations
as those entered by the United States, accepting Art. 36(1) unconditionally and expres-
sing reservations and conditions to Art. 36(2). See id. at 50-51 (referencing U.S. stipula-
tion to ICJ Statute art. 36(2)).
136. See id. (demonstrating influence of developing countries).
137. See GAMBLE AND FISHER, supra note 5, at 32 (stating that between 1948 and
1975, ICJ handed down twenty-six contentious cases and fourteen advisory opinions).
138. See Highet, supra note 31, at 339-41 (examining ICJ workload through 1994
and noting that ICJ has rendered fifty-[six] decisions in contentious cases, handed
down twenty-one advisory opinions, and currently has ten contentious cases and one
advisory opinion before Court).
139. See id. (emphasizing that eighteen cases came within last decade). Through
1996, the cases currently before the ICJ include Airbus (Iran v. U.S.); East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.); Guinea-Bissau (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.); Qatar-Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.); Lock-
erbie (Libya v. Gr. Brit.) (Libya v. U.S.); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.); Genocide (Bos.
and Herz. v. Serb. and Mont.); Danube; Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v.
Nig.); Nuclear Weapons (Advisory); and NATO (Serb. and Mont. v. NATO members).
Id.
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The states that choose to utilize the ICJ to resolve their dis-
putes govern the Court's current direction toward complete util-
ization. 14° This new trend in ICJ utilization may be identified by
the fact that most of the present cases the Court has in its juris-
diction have been brought by application under the optional
clause of Article 36 or under a compromissory clause of a bilat-
eral or multilateral treaty. 141 Also, the new trend in utilization
specifically identifies the constituency of the ICJ. t 42 During the
past decade the constituency of the Court has grown to include
many developing countries. 4 These developing countries, by
definition, require the additional strength and protection of the
Through 1996, the cases recently decided by the ICJ included Nicaragua Interven-
tion (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 13); Arbitral Award (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.),
1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12); El Salvador/Honduras (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.CJ. 351 (Sept.
11); Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240;Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38
(June 14); Libya-Chad (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3); and Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1). Id.
140. See Highet, supra note 31, at 344 (discussing influence states have on direc-
tion of ICJ's current trend).
141. See id. at 346-47 (suggesting that ICJ workload has increased due to willing-
ness of states to enter pre-determined jurisdiction of ICJ). Much of the tendency to
pre-commit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ is owed to the use of bilateral treaty provisions
in treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Id. Iran was able to hold the
United States to the jurisdiction of the ICJ based on the multilateral treaty provisions of
the Chicago Convention of 1944, the 1971 Montreal Convention, and the 1955 Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran.
See Airbus (Iran v. U.S.) (demonstrating how U.S. jurisdiction was based on consent);
see also Highet, supra note 31, at 347 (discussing U.S.jurisdiction). Libya is also able to
proceed against the United Kingdom and the United States under the Montreal Con-
vention because they are both parties to the same multilateral treaties. See Lockerbie
(Libya v. Gr. Brit.) (Libya v. U.S.) (demonstrating how U.S. jurisdiction was based on
consent, via convention or treaty); see also Highet, supra note 31, at 347 (discussing U.S.
jurisdiction). A compromissory clause can create ICJjurisdiction based on each of the
parties in the case agreeing to jurisdiction at the conception of their treaty. See Geno-
cide (Bos. and Herz. v. Serb. and Mont.) (demonstrating how U.S. jurisdiction was
based on pre-treaty perceptions); see also Highet, supra note 31, at 347 (discussing U.S.
pre-treaty determination). The East Timor and the Guinea-Bissau cases, however, are
based on declarations of adherence to the optional clause of Art. 36. See East Timor
(Port. v. Aust.) (demonstrating how jurisdiction was based and discussing determina-
tion ofjurisdiction by state); Guinea-Bissau (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (demonstrating how
jurisdiction was established); Highet, supra note 31, at 347.
142. See Highet, supra note 31, at 346-47 (distinguishing those states that proscribe
to the ICJ for dispute resolution).
143. See id. at 348-49 (stating that constituency of ICJ has grown as new members
of world community bring cases). The world community now includes Eastern Europe
and the Balkans, as demonstrated by Danube and Genocide cases, and includes Central
West Africa, as demonstrated by Land and Maritime Boundary case. Id.
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Court1 " to bring the developed countries to the table to com-
promise and resolve disputes. 4 ' Neither China nor Russia has
litigated a case before the ICJ.1' France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States have been involved most frequently as re-
spondents.'
4 7
II. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF THE ICJ
Past decisions of the ICJ are not binding, but the ICJ some-
times does refer to its past opinions when deciding new cases.' 4 8
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute states which sources of law the
ICJ may use to decide cases.' 49 The Court rationalizes its refer-
ence to its past decisions as a means of maintaining con-tinuity. 15 0
A. Statutory Authority of the ICJ Article 59 and Non-Binding
Precedent
The ICJ Statute defines who is bound by the decisions of the
ICJ, when they are bound, and what they are bound to do.15 1
The Court gathers its ethos, or authority, from these guide-
lines. 112 ICJ opinions are binding only on the parties 53 to each
144. See id. at 346-47 (suggesting that developing countries need special help).
145. See id. (implying that developed countries hesitated to bind themselves with
developing countries because it levels political and economic playing fields).
146. See Higher, supra note 31, at 346-47 (discussing limited participation); see also
FRNcK, supra note 14, at 8-9 (discussing Russia's and China's hesitation to participate
in ICJ adjudication).
147. See Highet, supra note 31, at 346-47 (describing France's, Great Britain's and
United States' limited interaction with states under jurisdiction of ICJ).
148. See id. at 339 (suggesting that ICJ used its past decisions as rationale for pres-
ent decisions).
149. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 38(1), at 79 (discussing applicable law of ICJ).
These sources include: a. international conventions and treaties; b. international cus-
tom; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and d. judicial
decisions. Id.
150. See THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE, 62-63
(1979) [hereinafter THE REGISTRY] (referencing consistency of ICJ's decisions); see also
Highet, supra note 31, at 339 (discussing continuity between PCIJ and ICJ).
151. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 59, at 85 (binding only parties of each instant
case to decision of ICJ in that case). "The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Id. The language of
Art. 59 reflects the negative nature of this guideline. See LAw AND PRAcriCE OF THE ICJ,
supra note 30, at 618 (stating authoritative scope of ICJ decisions); see also ICJ STATUTE,
supra note 58, art. 38, at 79. See also, supra note 58 (describing limits of ICJ's decisions).
152. See GAL, supra note 1, at 8 (suggesting that courts get their authority from
within parameters of who, what, and how they bind states to its decisions).
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particular dispute. 54 The ICJ's jurisprudence carries a binding
force because of the authoritative character of the Court's deci-
sions. 55 An ICJ judgement binds parties on the day the Court
reads the decision in open Court. 156
The ICJ's past decisions do not bind it, but, in the ICJ's dis-
cretion, it may refer to its past opinions when rendering new
decisions. 15 7 The ICJ frequently refers to its past decisions when
interpreting international laws and treaties, or when formally ac-
knowledging new customary international law.15 8 States do not
know whether the past decisions of the Court will serve as prece-
dents 5 9 in potential disputes, or will be ignored. 160 Some states
rely on past interpretations of the ICJ pertaining to customary
laws,16 1 local practices, or trade customs.' 62 Other states specifi-
153. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 34, at 75 (describing ICJ as Court for states).
Only states may be parties in contentious cases before the Court. Id. Intergovernmen-
tal organizations and individuals are excluded as parties to litigation before the ICJ. See
WORLD COURT, supra note 2, p. 82 (stating, "Art. 34 originated from the notion that
only states have personalities"). The Court, however, may issue advisory opinions to the
Security Council, the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Specialized Agen-
cies of the United Nations. ICJ STATUTE arts. 65-68, supra note 58, at 87, 89; ICJ RULES
arts. 102-109, supra note 69, at 271, 273, 275.
154. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 59, at 85. ICJ decisions have no binding force
except between the parties and in respect to that particular case. Id.
155. See LAw AND PR acrIcE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 49-50 (discussing authori-
tative weight of judicial decisions).
156. ICJ Rules supra art. 94, note 58, at 267.
157. See Highet, supra note 31, at 339 (discussing ICJ's references to past decisions
when issuing rulings).
158. See LAw & PTIcrCE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 611-12 (stating that referring
to past decisions by ICJ is not out of ordinary practice).
159. See id. (implying uncertainty of Court's action whether to apply precedent or
not); see also SHAW, supra note 108, at 87 (defining precedent as application of past
decisions).
160. See SHAW, supra note 108, at 86-87 (discussing available uses of past judicial
decisions).
161. See id. at 6 (defining customary international law). Customary international
law includes texts of international instruments and decisions of international courts.
Id. Customary international law may also include decisions of national courts and na-
tional legislation. Diplomatic correspondence and opinions of national legal advisors,
with reserve to No. 4 of Article 38 (1), are sometimes considered in the formalizing of
customary international law. Id. The practice of international organizations, certain
types of resolutions of United Nations organs and of the Specialized Agencies, reports
of the International Law Commission, and correspondence between the Registry of the
Court and the party-states are also included as contributors of customary international
law. Id.
162. See Law & PRAcriCE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 611-13 (discussing ICJ choice
in relying on precedent).
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cally disregard all past decisions of the ICJ pertaining to inter-
pretations of customary laws, local practices, and trades. 163
Problems arise when states in dispute approach possible resolu-
tion of the problem with differing philosophies toward the ICJ's
past decisions. 164
The framers of the ICJ Statute feared that the Court's ob-
servers would misinterpret and misapply its rulings if allowed to
refer to them as precedent. 65 The framers' decision not to in-
corporate a rule of stare decisis was an attempt to allow this new
institution the appropriate room to develop.1 66 The framers
thought that the judicial decisions would be too sparse to de-
velop a complete reservoir of precedents and a method or phi-
losophy of employing those precedents. 67
B. ICJ Issuance of Opinions
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute lays out the sources of law
the ICJ uses when deciding cases. 68 The Court references past
decisions to maintain continuity of tradition, case law, and meth-
ods of work.169 The Court places great importance in finding
and applying international law consistent with its prior deci-
sions. 70
1. Court's Interpretation of Article 38
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute enumerates the sources of
law the ICJ applies when deciding disputes. 7 ' Early attempts to
set out the international rules of law for nations placed great
163. See id. (illustrating literal meaning of Art. 59, which does not hold past deci-
sions of ICJ as precedent).
164. See id. at 611-12 (demonstrating how different states choose to view ICJ deci-
sions in varying manners in pursuit of their self-interest).
165. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 239-41 (discussing intent of framers of ICJ
Statute to limit application of PCIJ decisions to prevent misinterpretation and misuse).
166. See LAw & PRACTICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 611-13 (explaining intent of
framers of ICJ Statute to give the early Court proper opportunity to fine tune its appli-
cation of law without being bound by its first attempts).
167. See id. at 611-13 (suggesting rationale of framers for excluding stare decisis).
168. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 38(1), at 79 (stating applicable law of ICJ).
169. See THE REGISTRY, supra note 150, at 62-63 (referring to how ICJ attempts to
maintain continuity of PCIJ and ICJ opinions); see also Highet, supra note 31, at 339
(discussing how ICJ rules on cases with attention to consistency of its judicial voice).
170. See Highet, supra note 31, 337-39 (discussing ICJ's practices).
171. ICJ STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 38(1), at 79 (discussing applicable law of ICJ).
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emphasis on the enumerated list.172 A framer of the PCIJa73 sub-
mitted a proposal that became the motivating essence of the
present day Article 38, 17 designating the rules of law applied by
the PCIJ, and later by the ICJ. 175
The rule setting forth international law as recognized by civ-
ilized nations created problems because the Court could not
agree on the general law it would apply in the absence of a con-
ventional or universal customary rule.176  The framers of the
Statute intended for the Court to be representative of civilization
and major legal systems by adopting the conventions and cus-
tomary rules of party states.' 77 Critics of the framers argued,
however, that as long as every country had its own public interna-
tional law on certain questions, those countries would not con-
sent to submit to a judicial authority that had power to apply
international law as interpreted by some other nation. 178 Others
discussed the possibility of creating a legislature to prepare
world codes, but the framers dismissed this idea because it would
not have the sanction of the individual governments and would,
therefore, have a negative impact on national sovereignty.179
Still others considered the possibility that, in the absence of a
172. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 239 (discussing ICJ enumerated jurispru-
dence and arguing observers of ICJ place great emphasis upon it).
173. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 95 (defining framers as appointed cre-
ators of PCIJ). The League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee ofJurists, or
framers, to prepare a plan for establishing the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 95.
174. See id. (describing formation of Article 38 during creation of PCIJ).
175. See id. at 239-40 (describing process of PCIJ creation). An early proposal of
Art. 38 suggested:
[t]he following rules are to be applied by the judge in the solution of interna-
tional disputes; they will be considered by him in the order given below:
1. Conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules
expressly adopted by the states;
2. International custom, being a practice between nations accepted by
them as law;
3. The rules of international law as recognized by the legal conscience of
civilized nations;
4. International jurisprudence as a means for the application and devel-
opment of law.
Id.
176. See DEBuSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 240 (discussing dilemma faced by Court).
177. See SHFARER, supra note 3, at 29 (describing PCIJ creation and suggesting
framers' intent).
178. See DFBusTAMmANE supra note 4, at 240 (criticizing framers' intent).
179. See id. (proposing substitute for framers' design).
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treaty or custom, the Court should refuse to decide questions,
leaving the states without a solution to their dispute.18 0
After a series of amendments, the framers created a new
proposal for the designated sources of law under Art. 38.181 The
first change in this proposed text added at the beginning of Art.
38(4), a phrase by which decisions would be binding only on the
parties to the case decided.18 2 Framers of the proposal believed
that decisions of the Court could serve as a source of reference
for the Court during its decision-making, but not as a future
source of applicable law relied on by states.18 3
As this proposal passed through several stages of evolution,
it underwent alterations which helped to shape the current in-
terpretation of the rules of law that the Court applied.1 8 4 One
alteration was the removal of the provision requiring application
of the four sources of law, in the order they are listed.' 5 An-
other alteration was the addition of a new paragraph stipulating
that provisions about the applicable law should not prevent the
Court from attempting to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree to it.'86 These alterations in fact changed the defi-
180. See id. (suggesting alternatives to framers' design).
181. See id. at 240-41 (describing how framers created draft of sources of applica-
ble law). The draft proposed by the framers suggested that:
[t] he Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction ... apply in the order
following:
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice which is ac-
cepted as law;
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists and of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
Id.
182. ICJ Draft art. 38. This non-precedent phrase references the original form of
the present day Article 59 of the Statute of the Court. Id. While the provisions of Art.
59 bind only the parties of the case, the provisions of Art. 38 restrict the decisions even
more by referring to judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists as only a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. Id.
183. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 236-37 (suggesting that laypersons could
not properly apply past decisions and therefore only ICJ judges could properly refer-
ence past decisions).
184. See id. at 240-41 (presenting rules of law currently applied).
185. See id. (discussing development of sources of applicable law).
186. ICJ. STATUTE, supra note 58, art. 38(2), at 79; see DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4,
at 241 (granting parties right to authorize ICJ to decide case outside of established law).
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nition of the Court itself, from simply a court of arbitration to a
judicial power defining the breadth of the interpretive sources,
as well as being the interpreter of predetermined sources.18 7
The addition of ex aequo et bono diminished the obligatory
force of international jurisprudence to an auxiliary method of
determining the rules.' 8 This emancipation of the Court, from
the severity of Article 38(1) enumerations, has permitted the
first steps toward the Court's consideration of constituent ele-
ments 8 9 of the concrete dispute referred to the Court even if
not germane to the legal issues. 9 ' The ICJ has not utilized the
option of deciding a case ex aequo et bono.' 9 1 Applying the
sources of law presented in Article 38(1) to the concrete
problems before it, the Court's statements are always directed
toward the specific problem.1 92 The framers' intention was to
prevent an observer of the Court from mistakenly reading more
into those statements than the Court ever intended. 193
2. The Court's Use of Precedent
The Court references past decisions to maintain continuity
in its work.1 94 The Court often cites previous cases 19 5 in support
187. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 241 (describing way alterations changed
role of ICJ from neutral conductor of law to effectual interpreter of law).
188. See id. (discussing effect of ex aequo et bono on international jurisprudence).
189. See id. (defining constituent elements). Constituent elements include unique
geographical factors and economic interests peculiar to the region affected by the dis-
pute as to sovereignty. Id.; see also Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Nor.), 1951
I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) (demonstrating use of constituent elements in deciding case).
190. See DEBuSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 241 (illustrating freedom of ICJ to oper-
ate outside of sources of law); see aLso LAw AND PRAcTICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at
605 (discussing options of ICJ in deciding cases).
191. See DEBUSTAMANTE, supra note 4, at 241 (stating that ex aequo et bono has not
been used to date).
192. See LAW & PRACTICE OF THE ICJ, supra note 30, at 613 (stating that sources of
law are applied to issue at hand in present case).
193. See id. (explaining framers' intentions and reasoning for omitting any form of
stare decisis). The ICJ, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, stated that Art. 38 is
mandatory and the Court must apply judicial decisions only as a subsidiary means for
determination of rules of law. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Gr. Brit. v. Iran), 1952
I.CJ. 93 (Preliminary Objection ofJuly 22) (emphasizing that ICJ must follow rules of
law stipulated in its Statute).
194. See THE REGISTRY, supra note 150, at 62-63 (describing ICJ's motivation for
continuity).
195. See Highet, supra note 31, at 339 (describing previous cases which include
caseload of both PCIJ and ICJ).
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of its reasoning, resulting in unity of precedent. 196 All ICJ deci-
sions flow from and are built upon past decisions, 197 although
the ICJ has been careful to refrain from indicating that reliance
on precedent was mandatory. 9 '
The Court gives great weight to finding and applying inter-
national law consistent with its prior decisions. 199 This practice
guides the development of future international law200 which pre-
serves continuity in the. ICJ's decisions." 1 Following precedent
allows the Court to influence the attitude of states toward ques-
tions that the ICJ has already addressed. ° Accordingly, the
Court may find itself compelled to apply an international cus-
tom, to which it may have contributed, in deciding a case before
it.203
III. THE ICJ'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS STATUTORY
MANDATE UNDERMINES ITS RHETORICAL
AUTHORITY
The Court's actions encourage states to treat its judicial
196. See THE REGISTRY, supra note 150, at 62-63 (stating that ICJ has inherited
benefits of jurisprudence of its predecessor PCIJ). Legal scholars and practitioners
alike tend to assimilate the case law of the ICJ with the case law of the PCIJ. HICHET,
supra note 31, at 339; WORLD COURT, supra note 2, at 23-25.
197. See Highet, supra note 31, at 339 (discussing nature and tse of past ICJ deci-
sions).
198. See THE REGISTRY, supra note 150, at 62-63 (emphasizing that ICJ does not
acknowledge any requirement on its part to utilize its past decisions).
199. See Highet, supra note 31, 337-39 (discussing ICJ's practices).
200. See id. (discussing affect of ICJ's practice on development of international
law). The Court's use of precedent sends the message to outside parties that this is
consistent with the accepted interpretation of past treaties and this consistent interpre-
tation is thereafter applied by those outside parties, creating a mulitinational practice
which leads to new international law. See e.g. Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) (illustrating ICJ's use of precedent which established
world community practice).
201. See id. (describing contribution of effect of ICJ's practice to continuity in un-
derstanding of international law as ruled upon by ICJ). The Fisheries case provides an
example of the Court establishing a method of delimiting territorial waters which the
Court continues to utilize. Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116
(Dec. 18) (illustrating ICJ's use of same approach to determine boundaries in similar
cases).
202. See THE REGISTRY, supra note 150, at 62-63 (illustrating effect of ICJ precedent
on states in future disputes).
203. See id. at 63 (suggesting that because ICJ opinions influence states' behavior,
that behavior may become international custom and thereby become one of sources of
law applied to decide cases).
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rhetoric with authority,20 4 and therefore require that the Court's
rhetoric be legitimately authoritative, with statutory support. °5
While there is no doctrine of stare decisis guiding the Court,2 "6 it
has still tried to ensure consistancy by taking into account its ear-
lierjudgments and examining them closely when rendering new
decisions. 2°7 Therefore, the Court's practice should be clarified
by statute.
A. The Court's Use of Precedent Violates Its Own Statute
Despite the written rules addressing the framers' fears that
the judicial decisions would be too sparse, the ICJ has developed
a complete reservoir of precedents and a method of employing
those precedents.20° The contradiction between written rule of
the statute and actual practice of the ICJ is the heart of each
state's dilemma.209 The Court's reasoning for what it regards as
the correct legal position and the rationale of why that position
is correct contribute to the reservoir of public international
law.210 While the Court closely examines its previous deci-
sions,211 it carefully distinguishes cases that it feels are non-appli-
cable to a present case.21 2 The Court distinguishes between the
binding effect attributed to the decision for continuity and the
statement of what the Court considers to be the correct legal
position.213 The Court also examines whether or not the legal
position of a past case is relevant to the circumstances of its pres-
204. See supra notes 4, 55 and accompanying text (discussing ability of ICJ to de-
cide cases without referencing past decisions).
205. See id. (suggesting that IGJ should have proper authority attached to its deci-
sions).
206. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating limitations of ICJ decisions
binding effect).
207. See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text (describing sources and system
of international law that ICJ applies).
208. See it. at 611-3 (suggesting rationale of framers for excluding stare dec/sis and
present day method of applying precedent).
209. See supra notes 159-161, 163-165 (analyzing IGJ's violation of its own statute
regarding precedent).
210. See id. (discussing valuable use of past decisions in explaining rationale of
present opinion).
211. See supra note 108, at 86 (describing practice of iq in presenting rationale of
Court).
212. See id. (examining ability of ICJ to differentiate between cases that are applica-
ble and non-applicable to present case).
213. See supra note 30, at 620 (distinguishing between opinion and precedent).
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ent case. 14
The Court's willingness to allow states to attribute authorita-
tive value to its rhetoric requires the Court's rhetoric to be legit-
imately authoritative, with statutory support. 15 The decisions of
the Court are usually accepted in later decisions and formula-
tions of international law, although there is occasional opposi-
tion.2 1 6 The degree of respect accorded the Court's decisions
make them an essential factor in the growth and exposition of
international law.217 The Court should strive to follow its previ-
ous judgments because states are inclined to defend their side of
a dispute by citing the Court as an authoritative source, even
though precedent does not formally exist in international law.2 18
Although the framers believed that the tendency to recog-
nize that judicial decisions have some precedential value is a nat-
ural one which does not require doctrines of binding prece-
dent,2 19 they failed to realize that judicial precedent is not the
indirect by-product of judicial decisions. Rather, judicial prece-
dent is the direct by-product of the Court's permanent and au-
thoritative nature, interpreting and restating international
law.2 This contribution has made the decisions of the ICJ one
of the most important sources of the rules of international law
and one of the law's most powerful vehicles for adapting to the
constantly changing international scene.2 21
214. See id. at 620-21 (applying discretion of ICJ to each particular case).
215. See supra notes 30, 108, 150, 154 and accompanying text (analyzing accept-
ance of ICJ's past decisions). See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia v. Thail.),
1962 LC.J. 6 (June 15) (illustrating principles of ICJ Statute art. 59 and referring to ICJ
decision in Aerial Incident case, stating that by reason of Article 59 of ICJ Statute, deci-
sion produced in Aerial was only binding on parties to that case and had no effect on
parties of Temple).
216. See id. (suggesting ICJ should have proper authority attached to its decisions).
217. See supra note 108, at 87 (stating how essential ICJ's decisions are in growth
and development of international law).
218. See id. (suggesting ICJ follow its own precedent in order to provide authority
for states to reference).
219. See supra note 30, at 612 (stating ICJ did not believe it needed to specifically
recognize precedent, because precedent carried natural amount of clout by itself).
220. See id. (suggesting nature of precedent carried with it responsibility to attach
proper authority to rhetoric ofjudicial discourse).
221. See id. (suggesting judicial precedent is vital to continued, consistent interna-
tional law).
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B. The Court Must Apply Precedent In Order to Maintain Its
Credibility
States are heavily influenced by the positions previously
taken by the Court, therefore the authoritative value attributed
to its rhetoric requires the Court's rhetoric to be legitimate and
based on statute.222 The credibility of the Court's rhetoric, as an
authoritative source, is dependent upon its consistency when
finding and applying international law.2 23 Consistency in the
meaning and action of the Court and its statutorily authorized
rhetoric will inspire confidence in the Court's decisions.2 24
Judicial decisions do not equal State customs or traditions,
therefore, the Court must make its character appear authorita-
tive regarding future application of the precedents created by
the decisions it has made.225 State customs and traditions are
what the international community equates with customary inter-
national law.22 '6 Accordingly, because judicial decisions do not
equate to customary international law in consideration by the
Court as a source of law, judicial decisions are relegated to the
last enumeration of consideration by the Court. 227 In the ab-
sence of a covenant or treaty, and without customary interna-
tional law or general principles of civilized law to guide them,
states will seek out the next enumerated guideline to follow,
namely how the Court has dealt with this issue in its past deci-
sions .228
In an attempt to preserve the respected ethos of the Court,
222. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing authoritative value of
Court's rhetoric and examining effect of Court's judicial rhetoric).
223. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing ethos of ICJ). "Persuasion
is achieved by the [Court's] personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make
us think [it] credible." ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 7. See also supra note 4 and accompa-
nying text (discussing credibility of ICJ's rhetoric).
224. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting consistency is important
to character of ICJ).
225. See id. at 75 (stating importance of judicial discourse in its context as prece-
dent).
226. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing judicial precedent as
source of law applicable in ICJ).
227. See id. (explaining why judicial decisions are relegated to subsidiary status as
source of applicable law in ICJ).
228. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing when judicial decisions
of ICJ are employed by states).
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it is necessary for the Court to strive not to contradict itself. 29
The Court presents its past decisions as essential factors in its
rationale and interpretation of the applicable international
law,230 yet it refrains from indicating that doing so was obligatory
for it.2 3 ' However, States in disputes cite the Court as an authori-
tative source, according the Court's decisions respect.23 2 The
value of the Court's decisions is at once treated with high regard
by the states233 and formally dismissed by the Court itself.
2 3 4
This contrast between the priority given by the states to the
Court's jurisprudence and the priority given by the Court itself
undermines the ethos of the Court. Accordingly, the Court
must acknowledge the precedent set by its past decisions in or-
der to maintain its credibility.
C. To Protect the ICJ's Authority, the Statute of the ICJ Should Reflect
the Practice of the Court to Use Precedent
The Court's practice should be clarified by statute. Stare de-
cisis should formally bind the ICJ to give credence to the Court's
jurisprudence. 3 3 States rely heavily on the past decisions of the
Court as indications of how the Court will possibly rule in the
future.2 6 The Court relies heavily on its past decisions as a pow-
erful element in the consistency of its interpretations and appli-
229. See e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Gr. Brit. v. Iran) (arguing that despite
non-binding effect of decisions, ICJ's ethos depends on it not contradicting itself).
230. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing ICJ's referencing of past
decisions in its explanations and rationales for present cases). In the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case in which the Court's statement of criteria for the recognition of baselines
from which to measure the territorial sea boundaries was incorporated in the 1958
Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. See WORLD COURT, supra
note 2, at 86 (illustrating how ICJ used past decisions as rationale for present case).
231. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing non-binding nature of
ICJ's past decisions). Judge Read in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case said that the Court
was not obligated to apply the principles of past decisions to present disputes. Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. Case (Gr. Brit. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 5) (illustrating that ICJ is not
required to reference past decisions).
232. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (suggesting that state use ofjudicial
opinions as direction in that state's understanding of law and precedent create clout in
those judicial opinions).
283. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing usage of precedent by
states).
234. See id. (discussing usage of precedent by ICJ).
285. See supra note 28 (discussing the value and legitimacy that stare deisis adds to
judicial decisions.)
236. See it. (illustrating use of ICJ precedent by states).
1508 FORDHAM17VTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1479
cations of international law. 37 By formally reducing a judicial
decision to writing, the Court implies thatjudicial decision is the
rational application of law for the issue at dispute. In addition to
deciding a case, the Court develops a reasoned system of general
guidelines which reduces uncertainty about future deliberations
on similar issues in future disputes.238
Without binding the Court, the mere option of the Court to
reference its past decisions undermines the perceived legitimacy
of the Court's rhetoric. Without substantiating the ethos of the
Court, states cannot rely on the past interpretations despite the
presentation of those interpretations as authoritative in na-
ture.23 9 Even when a judicial decision goes against a party to a
suit, that party should be able to rely on the fact that when the
shoe is on the other foot, the Court will apply the same princi-
ples to its benefit.24 ° It is reasonable to suppose that, where the
ICJ has decided a case, it would have to have serious reasons for
thereafter deciding a similar case by adopting a different ap-
proach. 41 If the ICJ recognizes the expectation of continuity by
states, international law as interpreted and applied by the Court
will become normative and predictable. 242 Each time the ICJ re-
solves a dispute, it will reinforce a habit of state behavior.243
Binding the Court to its past decisions would serve to in-
crease the authoritative value of its rhetoric without unduly limit-
ing the flexibility of the Court to make new or innovative law.
The ICJ can examine its previous decisions and, when necessary
and appropriate, distinguish those cases which should not be ap-
plied to the problem at hand. Binding this Court through stare
decisis will not hamper its interpretive or creative authority. Stare
decisis will simply serve as the starting point, or anchor, for the
237. See id. (illustrating use of precedent by ICJ).
238. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (suggesting that ICJ use of prece-
dent eliminates uncertainty by states of future rulings).
239. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (arguing that without proper au-
thority substantiating judicial discourse of ICJ, there exists no value to rhetoric of ICJ
that states can rely on).
240. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (suggesting that states rely on consis-
tent application of its rationale).
241. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (explaining that Court does not
arbitrarily decide cases).
242. See id. (discussing international benefits of consistent application of law).
243. See id. (illustrating how state behavior is reinforced by consistent application
of law by ICJ).
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Court in providing legal guidance for the expanding law of the
world community.
Furthermore it rests with the supreme authority of the
Court to give authoritative decisions with respect to disputes be-
tween members of the world community."4 The Court's rheto-
ric exists to affect the giving of decisions,2 4 5 therefore, the Court
must not only make their decisions logical and fair, but also
make their character appear consistent and statutorily empow-
ered. Sound, consistent, and authoritative character, or ethos,
enhances the Court's influence."4 Accordingly, the statutorily
authorized application of precedent by the Court contributes to
its ethos. 47 If the Court's judicial rhetoric fails to be effective,
then the utilization of the Court may decline and return to the
under-utilization of the past.2 48
The Court is, in part, responsible for the international legal
order of the world community, 249 therefore, the Court must look
to its role in this new era as the reconciler of interests between
the developing states and the developed states. Only through
the Court's fair, consistent, and statutorily credible guidance will
developed countries and developing countries meet at the table
of peaceful compromise and dispute resolution. The effective-
ness of the Court's judicial rhetoric functions to provide the in-
frastructure required of the growing and culturally diverse inter-
national community. The ICJ's ethos, or character, determines
the trust imparted to the Court, either via compromissory
clauses or optional clauses.25 °
CONCLUSION
Implementing a doctrine of stare decisis will bestow great
credence upon the decisions coming from the ICJ. A statute
244. See supra notes 1, 8 and accompanying text (discussing influence of court's
rhetoric to affect disputes).
245. See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text (defining role of [c]ourt in dis-
pute settlement).
246. See supra note 30 (arguing value of strong, authoritative ethos of ICJ).
247. Id. (illustrating that statute backing authority of ICJ would make ethos of ICJ
stronger).
248. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (suggesting that continued use of
precedent by states depends on strong judicial authority).
249. See supra note 2 (stating ICJ's responsibility to settle disputes between states).
250. See supra notes 1, 8 (discussing various methods employed by states to submit
disputes to Iq).
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binding the Court will simply allow the Court to say what is writ-
ten is actually what is done. Binding the Court to its past deci-
sions would serve to increase the rhetorical ethos of the Court.
This practice should be reflected in the written statute that de-
fines the Court. Thereafter, the authority vested by states in the
jurisprudence of the Court will no longer be built upon that
false sense of security called unofficial practice. The jurispru-
dence of the Court will have a foundation built of statutory and
judicial practice, reflecting positively upon the character of the
ICJ.
